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Abstract: In this paper, we present a pricing mechanism that aligns incentives of agents
who exchange resources on a decentralized ledger with the goal of maximizing transaction
throughput. Subdividing a blockchain ledger into shards promises to greatly increase transaction
throughput with minimal loss of security. However, the organization and type of the transactions
also affects the ledger’s efficiency, which is increased by wallet agents transacting in a single
shard whenever possible while collectively distributing their transactions uniformly across the
available shards. Since there is no central authority to enforce these properties, the only means
of achieving them is to design the system such that it is in agents’ interest to act in a way
that benefits overall throughput. We show that our proposed pricing policy does exactly this by
inducing a potential game for the agents, where the potential function relates directly to ledger
throughput. Simulations demonstrate that this policy leads to near-optimal throughput under
a variety of conditions.
Keywords: blockchain, decentralized ledger, network throughput, potential game
1. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized ledgers, commonly implemented as en-
crypted linked lists of transaction records, or blockchains,
allow individuals to trade resources and maintain a com-
mon state machine securely and without a central author-
ity (Narayanan et al., 2016; Crosby et al., 2016). As the
demand for such systems grows, the slow throughput of
established systems, e.g. 7-15 transactions per second on
Bitcoin and Ethereum (Croman et al., 2016), is becoming
a major obstacle to more widespread adoption and suc-
cess, especially in applications requiring high frequency or
time-critical transactions. One innovation that promises
to significantly increase transaction throughput is subdi-
viding each the transaction records into distinct shards,
allowing parallel communication, execution and storage of
transactions that use different shards (Saraph and Herlihy,
2019). These subdivision methods have proven effective in
conventional databases (Corbett et al., 2013). By evenly
distributing transactions across multiple shards, the sys-
tem can process transactions much faster than a serial
blockchain ledger. However, in a decentralized system,
different external users submit transactions, and there
is no guarantee that they will choose to distribute their
transactions in a way that enables the system to operate
efficiently. In this paper, we investigate the use of small
transaction surcharges as incentives to align the goals of
the individual users with the system-wide goal of maxi-
mizing throughput.
Decentralized ledgers pose additional challenges due to
various stakeholders having different and often compet-
ing objectives. For example, it is in the agents’ inter-
est that transactions are fast and cheap, which is more
likely to occur when congestion is low, but miners or
validators (agents responsible for reaching a consensus on
which transactions are valid) benefit when transactions
are expensive, which may be the case when congestion is
high. These conflicting incentives must be accounted for in
the design of an effective sharding system for blockchain
ledgers.
Several proposals for sharding block chains have previously
been put forth (Kokoris-Kogias et al., 2018; Luu et al.,
2016; Zamani et al., 2018; Buterin, 2016), each of which
aims to make the ledgers more scalable while maintaining
appropriate levels of security. However, these approaches
all rely on randomization for distributing transactions
among shards and do little to explicitly mitigate the prob-
lems of load imbalance and frequent cross-shard transac-
tions, which consume resources in communication between
shards and potentially, depending on the sharding imple-
mentation, force the pausing of execution threads on one
or both shards.
We address these problems here with a transaction pricing
policy that incentivizes agents to choose shards in a
way that maximizes ledger throughput. In particular, the
proposed pricing function is based on a novel transaction
efficiency measure that induces a potential game for the
agents, where the potential function relates directly to
overall transaction throughput.
The problem considered here resembles that of congestion
games, a classic example of potential games, in which the
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goal is to minimize congestion in transportation or commu-
nication networks, for example, by setting prices to align
agent incentives with this goal (Monderer and Shapley,
1996). Indeed if the only goal were to minimize congestion
on the transaction network, this would be a straight-
forward application of congestion game theory. However,
the reduced efficiency caused by cross-shard transactions
introduces additional complexity that must be accounted
for in the pricing mechanism. By combining transaction
size and the distribution of transactions across shards into
a single quantity called transaction efficiency, we are able
to express the throughput objective as a function of agents’
shard choices and previous transactions, which we then use
to set the price. Decentralized ledgers sometimes use trans-
action fees as incentives for other agents to maintain the
ledger by validating transactions, so our proposal would
simply weight such fees to promote overall efficiency.
2. LEDGER AND TRANSACTION MODEL
The model consists of a set of agents who transact with
their neighbors in the network via a blockchain ledger.
2.1 Agents and network
The network consists of a set A of n agents who are
interconnected by the edges E ⊆ A2, where an edge
(i, j) ∈ E means that agent i can request a transaction
from agent j. We denote the set of neighboring agents
from which agent i requests transactions by Ni := {j ∈
A : (i, j) ∈ E}. Each agent i maintains a balance of
resources bi := [b
1
i , . . . , b
m
i ]
>, where bsi denotes the amount
of resources agent i owns in shard s ∈ S := {1, . . . ,m}, and
its objective is to choose shards and execute transactions
in a way that minimizes transaction fees.
2.2 Transactions
Assume that transactions are fully asynchronous and ar-
rive in a sequence where one agent (i, the receiver) requests
a transaction of an amount (a) from another agent (j, the
sender), such that the sender is in the neighbor set of the
receiver (j ∈ Ni). Let T := (i, j, τ ) denote a transaction re-
quested by agent i from agent j, where τ := [τ1, . . . , τm]
>
lists the amounts to be transferred in each shard, which we
assume are non-negative (each τs >= 0), and sum to the
total amount (
∑m
s=1 τs = a). The cardinality |ST | is the
number of shards used in the transaction. Let P denote the
set (or pool) of transactions that are waiting to be added to
a block. We define the price of a transaction as a function
of the transaction itself and the current transaction pool:
φ := f(T,P), to be given in precise terms in section 4. The
transaction process proceeds as follows:
(1) Request: Agent i requests a transaction from agent
j ∈ Ni and specifies an amount a and a shard si ∈ S
in which to receive the transaction, with the goal of
minimizing current and expected future transaction
fees. Only the sender pays the transaction fees, but
the receiver has an incentive to minimize these in
order to maximize the probability that the sender
accepts and fulfills the transactions. We can express
the receiver’s shard choice as
si ∈ arg min
s∈S
[
γrf(T,P) + (1− γr)E[φij ; si]
]
, (1)
where E[φij ; si] denotes the expected price of future
transactions from the sender to the receiver if the
receiver requests the current transaction in shard si,
and γr ∈ [0, 1] denotes the priority receiving agents
place on the current transaction fee relative to future
transactions. Estimating E[φij ; si] is a key element
in the pricing mechanism and is discussed further in
section 3.1.
(2) Fulfillment: Agent j accepts and fulfills the trans-
action if there are sufficient funds (including fees)
and chooses a set of shards Sj ⊆ S from which to
send resources, with the goal of minimizing current
and expected future transaction fees. Since the final
transaction always includes the receiver’s requested
shard si, the transaction set is given by ST := Sj ∪
{si}. The set of all feasible transaction shard sets is
then
Sj(a) :=
{
ST ⊆ S :
∑
s∈Sj
bsj ≥ a+ f(T,P)
}
.
For a requested transaction, we assume that the
sender chooses a shard set that minimizes the fol-
lowing expression:
Sj ∈ arg minST∈Sj(a)
[
γsf(S¯T ,P)+(1−γs)E[φij ; s]
]
, (2)
where γs ∈ [0, 1] denotes the priority sending agents
place on the current transaction fee relative to future
transactions. The sender withdraws the resources to
be transferred plus transaction fees from the shards
in S∗T , and the receiver adds the transferred balance
to shard si. The result is a transaction T that goes
into the transaction pool P ← P ∪ {T}.
(3) Block assembly:
We assume that the blockchain is divided into m
shards, each of which contains σ slots, and that the
blocks in each shard are produced synchronously.
Let Ps denote the set of transactions in pool P that
use shard s:
Ps := {(i, j, τ ) ∈ P : τs > 0}.
In this paper, we assume that when any shard be-
comes full (i.e., there exists a shard s such that |Ps| >
σ) the block is assembled from all transactions in the
pool and P is reset to empty. The maximum theoreti-
cal capacity of the blockchain (m×σ) is reached when
the cardinality of all transactions is one (no cross-
shard transactions) and each shard contains exactly
the maximum number of transactions. Note that it
may not be possible to execute both sides of multi-
shard transactions leading to failure of transactions of
this type. Therefore, assuming that all transactions in
the pool are executed, as we do in this study, leads
to optimistic estimates of the throughput in the case
of frequent cross-shard transactions. This leads to
conservative estimates of the performance gains that
would arise from implementing our proposed pricing
policy. Although this serves as a reasonable approxi-
mation for our purposes, coordinating states between
shards is a nontrivial problem and provides further
motivation to incentivize single-shard transactions.
We note that this analysis generalizes to blockchains
with complex state execution rules such as smart
contracts where cross-shard transactions require at
least twice the computation of an otherwise identical
single-sharded transaction.
3. TRANSACTION THROUGHPUT
Transaction throughput measures the number of transac-
tions processed in a given unit of time, but since we do
not explicitly include time in our model, we seek a time-
independent alternative quantity. Specifically, we define
the transaction efficiency of a pool P as the fraction
of the theoretical maximum number of transactions that
could be included in a block in which all transactions have
cardinality one and are evenly distributed across shards.
There are two primary factors that determine transaction
efficiency: cardinality and shard balance. We say that
shard balance is high when the transaction pool uses the
shards in roughly equal proportions and low when the
transaction pool uses some shards much more than others.
Figure 1 illustrates three partially completed blocks from
transaction pools exhibiting varying degrees of cardinality
and shard balance.
We measure shard balance in terms of the deviation from
uniform shard usage in the transaction pool. The usage
of each shard relative to the pool is given by u(P) :=
[u1(P), . . . , um(P)]>, where
us(P) := |Ps|∑
T∈P |ST |
.
Since we consider only positive transaction fees, we focus
on those shards with greater usage than average and define
the loading of shard s ∈ S by
λs(P) := max
(
0, us(P)− 1
m
)
.
These values are collected in the loading vector λ(P) :=
[λ1(P), . . . , λm(P)]>, and we can now quantify the shard
balance in the transaction pool as
BP(S) := 1−
∑
s∈S
λs(P). (3)
Note that by definition, BP(S) ∈ [0, 1). We can now ex-
press the total transaction efficiency as the shard balance
divided by the mean cardinality of all transactions in the
pool:
FP :=
BP(S)
1
|P|
∑
T∈P
|ST |
. (4)
As an example, for the middle block in Figure 1, the
shard usage is u(P) = (08 , 48 , 48 , 08 )>, resulting in the
loading vector λ(P) = (0, 14 , 14 , 0)> and total shard balance
BP(S) = 12 . Since the mean cardinality is one, the
transaction efficiency is 12 . For the left block in Figure 1,
since the shard balance is one and the mean cardinality is
two, the transaction efficiency is also 12 . The block on the
right achieves the maximum transaction efficiency of 1.
3.1 Expected transaction efficiency
We introduce for each edge (i, j) ∈ E along which a
transaction can take place, a shard request distribution
wij := [wij1, . . . , wijm]
>, where wijs denotes the proba-
bility that agent i will choose shard s when requesting
a transaction from agent j. Similarly, we define a shard
sending distribution vij := [vij1, . . . , vijm]
>, where vijs
denotes the probability that agent j will choose shard s
when sending a transaction to agent i. These randomized
distributions, which lie on a probability simplex (each
wijs ≥ 0 and
∑m
s=1 wijs = 1, and similarly for vij), model
the initial uncertainty about the shards used by neigh-
boring agents and how such uncertainty evolves toward
deterministic choices.
Expected cardinality: We can now write the expected
cardinality of transactions between agents i and j as:
E [|ST |] = w>ijPcardvij
= [wij1 wij2 ··· wijm ]
[ 1 2 ··· 2
2 1 ··· 2
...
...
. . .
...
2 2 ··· 1
] vij1vij2...
vijm
, (5)
where Pcard is a matrix that encodes the expected car-
dinality when the agents request transactions from each
other in the shards corresponding to the row and column
of each entry.
Expected shard balance: Similarly, we can express the
expected shard balance as follows:
E
[
1−
∑
s∈ST
λs(P)
]
= w>ijPbalvij =
[wij1 ··· wijm ]
 1−λ1 1−λ1−λ2 ··· 1−λ1−λm1−λ1−λ2 1−λ2 ··· 1−λ2−λm... ... . . . ...
1−λ1−λm 1−λ2−λm ··· 1−λm
[ vij1...
vijm
]
,
(6)
where Pbal encodes the shard balance values correspond-
ing to the shards used in the transaction (we omit the
argument P for a more compact expression).
Expected transaction efficiency: Based on the defi-
nition of transaction efficiency for the entire transaction
pool (4), we define the efficiency of a single transaction in
a given pool as the shard balance of the transaction shards
divided by the cardinality:
FP(T ) :=
BP(ST )
|ST | . (7)
Using (7), we can write the expected efficiency of transac-
tions from agent j to i:
E [FP(T )] = w>ijPeffvij =
[wij1 wij2 ··· wijm ]

1−λ1 1−λ1−λ22 ···
1−λ1−λm
2
1−λ1−λ2
2 1−λ2 ···
1−λ2−λm
2
...
...
. . .
...
1−λ1−λm
2
1−λ2−λm
2 ··· 1−λm

 vij1vij2...
vijm
.
(8)
4. TRANSACTION PRICING
We propose the use of transaction fees to align the individ-
ual goals of minimizing fees with the system-wide goal of
maximizing throughput. A natural choice is to make the
fee proportional to the desired objective, which we have
quantified as the transaction efficiency. Hence, we propose
the following pricing function:
Transaction T
Lane
High cardinality
High shard balance
Low cardinality
Low shard balance
Low cardinality
High shard balance
Fig. 1. Cardinality and shard balance in three different transaction pools assembled into blocks. Rows corresponds to
shards and columns represent block slices. The gray boxes symbolize transactions on the underlying shards.
f(T,P) := p0(T ) +
(
1− BP(ST )|ST |α
)
φmax, (9)
where p0(T ) is the nominal transaction price, which can
vary with computational requirements and market de-
mand, φmax is the maximum transaction fee, and α is a
free parameter that can be used to calibrate the cardinality
estimate or to further discourage multi-shard transactions.
Note that the price includes one minus the transaction
efficiency since the price should be low when the efficiency
is high. To simplify the remaining analysis, we assume that
p0(T ) = 0 and φmax = 1 unless otherwise stated. However,
it is straightforward to extend the analysis to include these
parameters.
While (9) defines the price for a particular transaction, the
expected price of a future transaction requested by agent
i from agent j is given by:
E [φij ] = 1−w>ijPvij = 1−
[wij1 wij2 ··· wijm ]

1−λ1 1−λ1−λ22α ···
1−λ1−λm
2α
1−λ1−λ2
2α 1−λ2 ···
1−λ2−λm
2α
...
...
. . .
...
1−λ1−λm
2α
1−λ2−λm
2α ··· 1−λm

 vij1vij2...
vijm
.
(10)
The expression (10) provides a direct link from the trans-
action price (9) to the agents’ optimal choice of shards
in which to request transactions for the case of agents
that wish to minimize long-term expected transaction fees
(γr = γs = 0), allowing us to rewrite (1) as follows:
w∗ij := arg max
wij∈∆m
w>ijPvij , (11)
where w∗ij denotes an update to the shard request distri-
bution wij and ∆m denotes the m-dimensional probability
simplex. The update (11) is indeed a best response of agent
i (in mixed-strategy space) to the mixed strategy of agent
j. Similarly, the sender’s optimal shard choice distribution
is given by
v∗ij := arg max
vij∈∆m
w>ijPvij , (12)
Since the sender also seeks to minimize long-term expected
transaction fees, this distribution update is indeed inde-
pendent from the choice of the receiver.
There is an important class of multi-player games called
potential games, in which players choose actions to max-
imize their individual utility functions, which in turn in-
creases some global utility function (Monderer and Shap-
ley, 1996). A key property of potential games is that when
agents act to improve their utility functions, the system
is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium, which
is a state in which no action by any single agent will
increase their utility. In potential games, Nash equilibria
also correspond to maxima of the global utility function.
We define potential games in precise terms below.
Let Si denote the space of actions for a single agent and let
S := Sni denote the set of all actions in the system. Denote
by ui : the utility function of agent i. Together these define
a game for the n agents, and such a game is said to be a
potential game if there exists a function H : S → R such
that for any agent i ∈ A and any pair of actions a, a′ ∈ Si
(where a−i denotes the actions of all agents except i):
H(a′i, a−i)−H(ai, a−i) = ui(a′i, a−i)− ui(ai, a−i).
Indeed we can show that the proposed pricing mechanism
induces a potential game over the transaction edges with
the following potential function:
H :=
∑
(k,l)∈E
w>klPvkl. (13)
Theorem 1. The game where n agents connected by the
edges E update their shard request and sending distri-
butions according to the edge-utility functions uij :=
w>ijPvij is a potential game with the potential function
(13).
Proof. Given an edge (i, j) ∈ E , suppose agent i updates
its shard request distribution for this edge from wij to w
′
ij .
Then, the change in the edge utility function is equal to
u′ij −uij = (w′ij −wij)>Pvij . The resulting change in the
potential function is
H ′ −H := (w′ij −wij)>Pvij ,
since the only change was to agent i’s shard request
distribution from agent j, which is exactly equal to the
change in the edge utility function uij . Similarly, if agent
j updates its shard sending distribution for this edge from
vij to v
′
ij , then the change in the edge utility function is
equal to H ′ij − Hij = w>(v′ij − vij), which is also equal
to the change in the potential function, completing the
proof.
Although the case we have analyzed is somewhat sim-
plified, the fact that it constitutes a potential game is
important because it ensures not only that the agents’
incentives are aligned with the global objective, but that
rational choices by the agents will result in convergence of
the system to a maximum of the global potential function,
which in our case corresponds to transaction throughput.
And their choices need not be optimal – the only require-
ment is that agents take actions that increase their local
utility function (lower their expected future transaction
price). This means that even deterministic shard choices
(pure strategy best or better responses) will lead to conver-
gence. For example, a pure strategy best response update
is given by replacing the probability simplex ∆m in (11)
with the set of all pure strategies Πm := {w ∈ ∆m : ws ∈
{0, 1} for each s ∈ S}.
A potential problem with the approach described so far
is that the update (11) assumes that agents know the
shard request or sending distribution of their transacting
neighbors along each edge, which would require additional
communication between agents. To resolve this, let’s as-
sume that agents keeps estimates (vˆij for the receiver,
wˆij for the sender) of the shard request and sending
distributions of each neighbor, constructed simply from
the normalized histogram of past transaction requests. The
new update rules that rely only on information available
to the respective agents are then:
w+ij := arg max
wij∈∆m
w>ijP vˆij , (14)
v+ij := arg max
vij∈∆m
wˆ>ijPvij . (15)
This turns out to be an example of fictitious play in game
theory, where agents estimate strategies of other players
based on empirical distributions. Indeed, multiplayer po-
tential games in which players act to improve their utility
using fictitious play are known to converge to a Nash
equilibrium (Marden et al., 2009).
The optimizations (14)-(15) are readily solved via linear
programming, and the deterministic (pure-strategy) case
is an integer program that reduces to finding the maximum
entry in a m-dimensional vector:
w+ij := arg max
wij∈Πm
w>ijP wˆji
= es∗ , where s
∗ = arg max
s∈S
Pswˆji, (16)
where es refers to column s of the m × m identity
matrix, and Ps denotes row s of the matrix P . A similar
modification can be made for the sending shard update.
The computational complexity of the pure-strategy and
mixed-strategy optimizations are linear and polynomial
(due to the complexity of linear programming, e.g. (Cohen
et al., 2019)), respectively.
5. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we investigate the performance of a simu-
lated blockchain ledger with transaction price (9) in which
agents update their shard request distributions with pure
strategy best response updates (16).
5.1 Ideal case
We begin with a simple scenario to test the pricing mech-
anism under ideal conditions. Suppose that 20 agents
transact with two neighbors each via a ring network on
a ledger with 4 shards. Each block contains 2500 slices
meaning that the maximum capacity is 10000 transac-
tions per block. In this scenario, agents start with an
arbitrarily large initial balance (1e6) in one shard (such
that the resources in these shards will not be depleted),
staggered among the agents, and transactions of a small
fixed amount (10) are generated randomly by rounds.
That is, each of the 38 edges in the network executes a
transaction in random order, and then the process repeats
in a new random sequence until 5 blocks are eventually
completed.
In the figures that follow, the x-axis corresponds to the
transaction index, where anytime one shard reaches maxi-
mum capacity, a block is assembled (indicated by the verti-
cal grid lines) and the transaction pool resets to zero. The
top panel shows the proportion of transactions contained
in each shard, resulting in the balance value shown on the
second panel. The third panel shows the mean transaction
cardinality and the fourth shows the transaction efficiency
calculated for each block. As a baseline, Figure 2 shows
the result of assigning transactions to random shards,
modeling a standard hash-based sharding protocol.
We observe that the randomized policy achieves a reason-
ably even distribution among the shards, but since the
mean cardinality is quite high, the efficiency is only about
50%, yielding 25899 transactions in 5 blocks.
0.25
0.50
tra
ns
. p
oo
l
0.8
1.0
sh
ar
d 
ba
l.
0
1
2
ca
rd
in
al
ity
0 5216 10416 15603 20756 25899
trans.
0.0
0.5
1.0
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
Fig. 2. Fixed price and random shard requests on 20-agent
ring network with 4 shards.
Next, we apply load-minimizing pricing by setting α = 0 in
(9) and allowing the agents to update their shard requests
with best-responses. Figure 3 shows that the loading stays
very low, but the transaction efficiency remains below 60%,
because the agents still have no incentive to transact in a
single shard and therefore engage in frequent multi-shard
transactions.
Finally, we see in Figure 4 that combining the proposed
pricing mechanism (α = 0.001) with best-response updates
results in high shard balance and low cardinality and
therefore almost perfect transaction efficiency.
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Fig. 3. Congestion pricing with best-response update on
20-agent ring network with 4 shards.
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Fig. 4. Efficiency pricing with best-response update on 20-
agent ring network with 4 shards (α = 0.001).
5.2 Larger random networks
In the next simulation study, we construct a directed
random network with a long-tailed degree distribution
using a preferential attachment model. Also, instead of
generating transactions on repeated random sequences of
edges, we generate them uniformly at random on the edges.
Blocks in this scenario contain 12500 slices and thus a
maximum capacity of 100000 transactions. In this case,
we initialized the agents with arbitrarily large balances in
each shard. Figure 6 shows that network still converges
to a high transaction efficiency compared to the baseline
shown in Figure 5. The gray data in the loading plot shows
how evenly distributed the shard requests are throughout
the network. As the agents acquire more information about
the shard preferences of their neighbors, the shard requests
converge to align with the corresponding send requests
while maintaining a balance across shards. The values of
α in both simulations were chosen by manual tuning, and
the results are somewhat sensitive to small changes in this
parameter. An automated tuning method for α would be
a useful direction for future research.
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Fig. 5. Fixed pricing with random shard requests on 100-
agent scale-free network with 8 shards.
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Fig. 6. Efficiency pricing with best-response update on
100-agent directed random network with 8 shards
(α = 0.00015).
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The pricing function (9) induces a potential game for the
users of a sharded blockchain ledger, such that is in their
interests to choose shards in a way that promotes ideal
throughput conditions on the ledger. Both the estima-
tion of shard request distributions and the deterministic
best-response policy are implementable with simple and
fast computations, and guarantee convergence to a Nash
equilibrium under some practical simplifying assumptions.
Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the policy in
various conditions.
We plan to extend the approach in several ways. For
example, there is currently no mechanism that would
encourage agents to request from different neighbors in
the same lane, although this would seem reasonable in
practice, especially if resources are scarce. This could be
achieved by adding a term that encourages agents to align
shard requests with their resource balance. We also intend
to more explicitly account for varying costs of transaction
and smart contract execution and storage.
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